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In June 2009, during Singapore’s pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
plan containment phase, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was in-
troduced into the country through imported cases. To un-
derstand how travel patterns affected the initial outbreak, 
we examined epidemiologic and travel data for the ﬁ  rst 116 
case-patients admitted to Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singa-
pore, with travel-associated infection. Sixty-one percent and 
54% of patients, respectively, met US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention and World Health Organization tem-
perature criteria for inﬂ  uenza-like illness. One fourth of the 
case-patients traveled after illness onset, and 15% became 
ill while traveling. Regions of exposure for imported infec-
tions changed rapidly; case-patients initially arrived from 
North America, followed by Australasia and Southeast Asia. 
Case-patients on longer ﬂ  ights were more likely to become 
ill before arrival; those with shorter ﬂ  ights tended to become 
ill after arrival. Thermal scanners detected fevers in 12% 
of the arriving case-patients, resulting in a shorter time to 
isolation. 
O
n April 24, 2009, international authorities reported 
cases of infection with a novel inﬂ   uenza A virus 
(H1N1) strain of swine origin, now known as pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus; 7 cases in the United States and 3 clus-
ters in Mexico were conﬁ  rmed, and surveillance indicated 
inﬂ  uenza-like-illness (ILI) had been increasing in Mexico 
since March 18, 2009 (1). During the next 3 months, this 
virus spread rapidly across the globe, resulting in >254,206 
cases and at least 2,837 deaths on 6 continents as of August 
30, 2009 (2). For most countries, the initial introduction of 
this virus occurred through international travel and human-
to-human transmission.
The role of air travel in the transmission and dissemina-
tion of respiratory infections has been examined for severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), pneumonic plague, 
and extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (3–6). Grais et 
al. (7) explored the possible effect of airline travel on geo-
graphic spread of pandemic inﬂ  uenza in 2000 through sim-
ulation models of the pandemic inﬂ  uenza A virus (H3N2) 
of 1968–69, using air travel data for 53 global cities. The 
effect of air travel on facilitating the transmission and dis-
semination of inﬂ  uenza is borne out by other recent studies 
suggesting that decreased volumes of air travel in the 2–3 
months after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 
September 11, 2001, delayed that winter’s seasonal inﬂ  u-
enza peak and decreased transmission (8).
Human-to-human transmission of inﬂ  uenza during air 
travel has been reported to occur on ﬂ  ights of at least 8 
hours and to affect passengers seated within 2 rows of the 
index case-patient (6). However, other reports show that 
respiratory infections can spread during shorter ﬂ  ights and 
over considerable distances within the cabin (3,9). For the 
purposes of inﬂ  uenza contact tracing, the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) has deﬁ  ned considerable exposure on 
aircraft as being restricted to passengers sitting in the same 
row or within 2 rows of an infectious person for a ﬂ  ight 
time of >8 hours (10).
Singapore implemented the containment phase of its 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza plan on April 27, 2009, before pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 was introduced into the country. Pub-
lic health policy during this phase was to isolate infected 
case-patients and quarantine exposed persons to prevent 
local transmission for as long as possible. During this ini-
tial period, travel from a pandemic (H1N1) 2009–affected 
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area was the major risk factor for infection; air travel was 
the main route of introduction. The containment phase was 
in effect for >2 months until epidemiologic surveillance 
indicated sustained community spread had begun during 
epidemiologic week 25 (week ending June 27, 2009). At 
that time, a gradual transition to mitigation measures was 
implemented.
During the containment phase, airport thermal scan-
ners were used to detect fevers in arriving passengers 
at Singapore’s Changi International Airport, and health 
advisories were used to encourage travelers in whom in-
ﬂ  uenza-like symptoms developed after disembarkation to 
seek medical care. Ambulances, dedicated for this pur-
pose only, were used to transport suspected case-patients 
from the airport to hospitals for screening. Adults with 
appropriate travel histories and ILI were referred to the 
designated screening center at Tan Tock Seng Hospital 
(TTSH) for treatment and isolation at the Communicable 
Disease Centre. During the mitigation phase, the focus of 
clinical and public health efforts shifted to caring for pa-
tients with severe illness and conditions that put them at 
risk for complications and to reducing transmission in the 
community through health education and voluntary self-
isolation of persons with ILI.
We analyzed epidemiologic and travel data as well as 
data regarding source of referral for case-patients in rela-
tion to time of illness onset, time of arrival in Singapore, 
and time to isolation. Understanding how travel patterns af-
fected propagation of the ﬁ  rst pandemic wave of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus could yield insights into how the antici-
pated next wave might be disseminated and provide data on 
the effectiveness and limitations of different interventions 
used to slow dissemination.
Methods
We obtained demographic data and travel-related infor-
mation (last port of embarkation and ﬂ  ight times) by direct 
interview and retrospective review of clinical notes. Dura-
tion of travel, which was calculated from ﬂ  ight times and 
transit time within airports, was categorized into 4 groups: 
short haul (<3 hours), medium haul (3–6 hours), long haul 
(6–15 hours), and extra-long haul (>15 hours). Clinical 
data were collected for symptoms and date and time of 
symptom onset (to the nearest hour in most instances and 
to the nearest 8-hour block [midnight to 7:59 AM, 8:00 AM 
to 3.59 PM, or 4:00 PM to 11:59 PM] if the patient was un-
sure). Symptom onset time was further categorized as be-
fore embarkation, during travel, or after disembarkation in 
Singapore. We also categorized hospitalized case-patients 
on the basis of whether their symptoms met US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) ILI criteria (body 
temperature >37.8°C with either cough or sore throat in the 
absence of an alternative diagnosis) and WHO ILI criteria 
(body temperature >38°C with either cough or sore throat 
in the absence of an alternative diagnosis) (11,12).
A conﬁ  rmed case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was de-
ﬁ  ned as an ILI in a patient with a temperature >37.5°C, 
cough, rhinorrhea, sore throat, or myalgia and with labo-
ratory conﬁ  rmation of infection by real-time reverse tran-
scription–PCR performed on respiratory samples (sputum 
or combined nasal and throat swab specimens). An im-
ported, travel-associated case was deﬁ  ned as above but oc-
curred in a person with recent travel outside Singapore who 
had arrived in Singapore during the containment period and 
had illness onset within 10 days of arrival. 
We compared proportions by using the χ2 test. Means 
were compared by use of t tests for dichotomous variables 
and 1-way analysis of variance for multichotomous vari-
ables. Stata 10.0 for Windows (StataCorp LP, College Sta-
tion, TX, USA) was used for all statistical analyses.
Results
From April 27 through June 27, 2009 (epidemiologic 
week 25), 152 persons with conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 were admitted to TTSH. Of the 152 patients, 116 met 
the deﬁ  nitions for having an imported, travel-associated 
case; the rest either did not have a history of travel or had 
onset of symptoms >10 days after their travel ended. These 
116 cases span 5 weeks (epidemiologic weeks 21–25) from 
when the ﬁ  rst conﬁ  rmed case-patient arrived in Singapore 
on May 26, 2009.
Demographic and travel data for patients with cases 
of imported pandemic (H1N1) 2009 are shown in Table 
1. Infections involved equal numbers of male and female 
travelers and occurred predominantly in young travelers 
(mean age 28.5 years; 70% were <30 and 7% were >50 
years of age). Half of the travelers were Singaporeans re-
turning from abroad, and the other half were travelers from 
other countries.
As shown in Figure 1, the regions where travelers were 
exposed to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus changed rapidly 
during the 5-week period of study. Most of the cases in 
epidemiologic weeks 21 and 22 (May 24 through June 6) 
were in patients who acquired their infection in the United 
States; however, within 2 weeks, this had changed dra-
matically, with a large proportion of cases coming from 
Australasia in epidemiologic week 23 (June 7–13). Within 
a week, this situation changed yet again; most infections 
originated from Southeast Asia by epidemiologic weeks 
24–25 (June 14–27).
The  ﬁ  rst cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 detected 
among travelers arriving from the Philippines (week 22), 
Thailand (week 23), and Indonesia (week 25) indicated po-
tential community transmission in those countries earlier 
than ofﬁ   cial announcements. Infections from Southeast 
Asian countries accounted for 29% of imported cases dur-
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ing the containment phase; the Philippines were linked to 
23% cases, mostly in weeks 24–25.
Travel duration reﬂ  ects the distance between the re-
gions of exposure and Singapore (Table 1). Of the 116 
case-patients, 19% had a short travel duration (<3 hours), 
and 20% had a long travel duration (>15 hours). Although 
most case-patients became ill after arrival at their destina-
tion, 25% were ill before travel and boarded their ﬂ  ight 
despite symptomatic illness, and 15% became ill while 
traveling.
Doctors based at the airport referred 15 (12.9%) of 
the 116 patients to TTSH; thermal scanners used to screen 
arriving passengers had detected fever in 14 of these 15 
patients. Of the remaining 101 patients, 51 (44%) self-re-
ported to the screening center at TTSH and 50 (43%) were 
referred by doctors in the community.
At the time of examination, 72% of case-patients had 
temperatures >37.5°C. However, only 61.2% had tempera-
tures >37.8°C and 54% had temperatures >38°C, the tem-
perature criteria used in the US CDC and WHO ILI case 
deﬁ  nitions, respectively. Considering the entire symptom 
complex, 51% of patients would have fulﬁ  lled ILI criteria 
as deﬁ  ned by the US CDC, and 44% would have fulﬁ  lled 
the WHO criteria (11,12).
As the pandemic shifted toward Asian ports of embar-
kation, the number of case-patients with travel durations of 
<8 hours increased (Figure 2, panel A). The time of symp-
tom onset relative to arrival in Singapore is shown in Fig-
ure 2, panel B; the ﬁ  gure does not include information for 
patients who were symptomatic before embarkation. Time 
of symptom onset was progressively closer to the time of 
arrival in Singapore for those arriving from longer distanc-
es (p = 0.001). Patients with longer travel durations were 
also more likely to have onset of symptoms before arrival 
(p = 0.04).
Port of embarkation, clinical symptoms, and duration 
of travel did not predict delay to isolation (Table 2). How-
ever, case-patients referred to TTSS by airport doctors had 
a shorter time to isolation (0.76 days) than self-referred 
patients or those referred by other sources (1.6–1.9 days). 
The number of case-patients referred by airport doctors 
increased over the 5-week period, but they represent only 
12% of all travel-associated cases (Figure 3). Although the 
mean duration to isolation did not increase signiﬁ  cantly 
over the study period, total numbers of case-patients with 
delays to isolation increased as the volume of travel-asso-
ciated cases rose.
Discussion
Given Singapore’s position as a major travel hub, with 
passenger trafﬁ  c at Changi International Airport exceed-
ing 37 million in 2008 (13), there is an ever-present risk 
of importation and subsequent community transmission 
of emerging respiratory infections. Such importation and 
transmission occurred during the SARS epidemic of 2003 
(14) and remains a concern during the current pandemic of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. In any epidemic, every im-
ported case may start a cluster of locally transmitted cases, 
but the number of imported cases and delays to isolation 
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Table 1. Demographic and travel-related data for 116 persons 
with travel-associated pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Singapore, April 
26–June 27, 2009* 
Data Case-patients, no. (%) 
Sex 
 M  59  (50.9) 
 F5 7   ( 4 9 . 1 )  
Age group, y 
<19 18 (15.5) 
 20–29  63  (54.3) 
 30–39  13  (11.2) 
 40–49  14  (12.1) 
>50 8 (6.9)
Nationality 
 Singaporean  58  (50.0) 
 Others  58  (50.0) 
Port of embarkation, by region 
 Americas  22  (19.0) 
  Asia   56 (48.3) 
 Australasia  31  (26.7) 
 Europe  7  (6.1) 
Duration of travel, h 
 <3  22  (19.0) 
 3–5.9  34  (29.3) 
 6–14.9  36  (31.0) 
>15 24 (20.7) 
Onset of symptoms 
  Before embarkation  29 (25.0) 
  While travelling  17 (14.7) 
  After disembarkation  70 (60.3) 
Source of referral to TTSH screening center 
  Airport doctor  15 (12.9) 
  Community doctor  50 (43.1) 
 Self-referred  51  (44.0) 
Screening criteria documented during clinical examination 
 Temperature  >37.5°C 84 (72.4) 
 Temperature  >37.8°C 71 (61.2) 
  Temperature >38.0°C  61 (52.6) 
  US CDC ILI criteria†   60 (51.7) 
  WHO ILI criteria‡  51 (44.0) 
Arrival at TTSH, by epidemiologic week§  
 21  5  (4.3) 
 22  8  (6.9) 
 23  13  (11.2) 
 24  41  (35.3) 
 25  49  (42.2) 
*TTSH, Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore; US CDC, US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention; ILI, influenza-like illness; WHO, World 
Health Organization. 
†Temperature >37.8°C plus cough or sore throat. 
‡Temperature >38.0°C plus cough or sore throat. 
§Week 21, May 24–30; week 22, May 30–June 6; week 23, June 7-13; 
week 24, June 14–20; week 25, June 21–27. RESEARCH
are particularly important at the start of the epidemic in de-
termining speed of spread within the community. Improv-
ing detection and shortening time to isolation of infectious 
persons could modify the outbreak curve and allow more 
time for improving community preparedness.
Improving detection and shortening the time to isola-
tion of sick persons is the rationale for using airport thermal 
scanners. Our data show that for the minority of cases de-
tected by airport thermal scanners, detection does result in 
a hospital referral by an airport doctor and shorter time to 
isolation. However, intrinsic limitations of airport thermal 
scanners are that passengers have to become symptomatic 
before disembarking from a ﬂ  ight and have a fever high 
enough to be detected. Our data show that >30% of case-
patients from all ﬂ  ights >3 hours had symptom onset before 
arrival, but overall, only 12% of all case-patients were de-
tected by thermal scanners, suggesting that thermal scan-
ners detected 40% of those symptomatic patients. This early 
detection and isolation may still have a valuable adjunctive 
role, especially in the initial phase of outbreaks. Situations 
favoring the use of airport thermal scanners include short-
incubation diseases and geographically distant outbreak 
epicenters, such that arriving passengers have been on a 
long-haul ﬂ  ight. However, if the converse were true, with 
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Figure 1. Sources of exposure, by 
region and country, among 116 patients 
in Singapore infected with pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus identiﬁ  ed  during 
epidemiologic weeks 21–25, 2009. A) 
Asia compared with other regions; B) the 
Philippines; C) Thailand; D) Indonesia; 
E) other Asian countries. Week 21, May 
24–30; week 22, May 30–June 6; week 
23, June 7–13; week 24, June 14–20; 
week 25, June 21–27.
Figure 2. Travel duration and illness 
onset relative to arrival in Singapore 
for 116 patients infected with pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus identiﬁ  ed  during 
epidemiologic weeks 21–25, 2009. 
A) Distribution of travel duration by 
epidemiologic week; B–E) timing of 
illness onset by travel duration in case-
patients who did not have symptoms 
before embarkation (n = 87). Black, 
travel duration <3 h; white, 3–5.9 h; 
red, 6–14.9 h; blue, >15 h. Mean time 
from arrival to illness onset was 3.5 
days (95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 1.9–
5.2), 1.7 days (95% CI 0.9–2.4), 1.0 
days (95% CI 0.4–1.6), and 0.8 days 
(95% CI 0.0–1.5), respectively. The 
percentage of patients with symptom 
onset before arrival was 0%, 14%, 
29%, and 33%, respectively. Week 21, 
May 24–30; week 22, May 30–June 6; 
week 23, June 7–13; week 24, June 
14–20; week 25, June 21–27. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Singapore
transmission occurring in nearby countries and passengers 
arriving from short-haul ﬂ  ights, symptoms would develop 
in most passengers who become ill after entry and, thus, 
would be missed by airport thermal scanners.
The fact that one fourth of the case-patients in our study 
boarded a plane after becoming ill and traveled despite hav-
ing symptoms illustrates the role of travelers in disseminat-
ing infection in a highly interconnected world. It raises the 
question of whether exit screening should be considered. 
However, the effectiveness of exit screening will depend 
on the role of asymptomatic persons in transmission, and 
such screening will still miss persons who are incubating 
the infection. Exit screening would severely hinder inter-
national travel, and because of its questionable efﬁ  cacy, it 
may not be justiﬁ  ed and may be contrary to the intent of the 
International Health Regulations 2005 (15)
Because 44% of the case-patients in this study were 
self-referred and 43% were referred by community physi-
cians, prevention efforts should focus on other strategies. 
For example, health advisories should be distributed to 
arriving passengers, encouraging them to seek medical 
care if ill, and steps should be taken to improve detec-
tion by physicians who see patients in their clinics. The 
importance of clinical judgment, epidemiologic history, 
and access to diagnostic testing is emphasized by the sub-
stantial minority of case-patients who would not have met 
the WHO or US CDC ILI criteria but who did have labo-
ratory-conﬁ  rmed infection. However, our study did have 
limitations: clinical features were assessed at a single time 
point (on arrival at the hospital screening center) and there 
was potential recall bias.
Our data demonstrate how swiftly situations can change 
in a fast-moving pandemic; affected areas shifted from the 
Americas to Australasia to Asia within a matter of days. 
These rapid shifts pose a tremendous challenge to health 
authorities responsible for outbreak management, and 
they emphasize the narrow window of opportunity during 
which interventions can slow an epidemic. The monitor-
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 1, January 2010  25 
Table 2. Predictors of time to isolation for 116 patients with travel-associated pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Singapore, April 26–June 27, 
2009*
Predictive factor  No. patients  Delay to isolation, mean no. days (95% CI)†  p value‡ 
Port of embarkation  0.718
  Asian countries  56 1.64 (1.32–1.96) 
  All other countries  60 1.55 (1.20–1.91) 
Source of referral to TTSH  0.015
  Airport doctors  15 0.76 (0.33–1.19) 
  Community doctors  50 1.58 (1.28–1.88) 
 Self-referral  51 1.85  (1.44–2.27) 
Met US-CDC ILI criteria§  0.426
 No  56 1.69  (1.31–2.08) 
 Yes  60 1.50  (1.21–1.79) 
Met WHO ILI criteria¶  0.650
 No  65 1.64  (1.30–1.99) 
 Yes  51 1.53  (1.21–1.86) 
Time of onset of symptoms  0.664
  Before embarkation  29 1.78 (1.14–2.42) 
  While traveling  17 1.49 (0.87–2.12) 
  After disembarkation  70 1.54 (1.29–1.80) 
Duration of travel, h  0.350
 <3  22 1.96  (1.37–2.55) 
 3–5.9  34 1.39  (1.03–1.74) 
 6–14.9  36 1.69  (1.31–2.08) 
>15 24 1.41 (0.74–2.08) 
Arrival at TTSH, by epidemiologic week#  0.868
 21  5 1.83  (0.50–3.15) 
 22  8 1.30  (0.44–2.16) 
 23  13 1.87(1.13–2.61) 
 24  41 1.61  (1.17–2.05) 
 25  49 1.53  (1.19–1.87) 
*CI, confidence interval; TTSH, Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore; US CDC, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; ILI, influenza-like illness; 
WHO, World Health Organization. 
†No. days from arrival to hospital examination in patients with onset before arrival and no. days from onset to hospital examination in patients with onset 
after arrival. 
‡p value by t test for dichotomous variables and 1-way analysis of variance for multichotomous variables. 
§Temperature >37.8°C plus cough or sore throat. 
¶Temperature >38.0°C plus cough or sore throat. 
#Week 21, May 24–30; week 22, May 30–June 6; week 23, June 7-13; week 24, June 14–20; week 25, June 21–27. RESEARCH
ing of travelers fulﬁ  lls a vital sentinel surveillance function, 
providing an early indicator of community transmission 
in countries even before transmission has been ofﬁ  cially 
conﬁ  rmed. Understanding how travel-associated infections 
propagated the ﬁ  rst wave of this pandemic yields rich in-
sights into how health authorities might respond to future 
outbreaks of emerging respiratory infections.
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Figure 3. A) Source of referral to Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH) 
and B) time to isolation for 116 patients infected with pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus, Singapore. Week 21, May 24–30; week 22, May 
30–June 6; week 23, June 7–13; week 24, June 14–20; week 25, 
June 21–27. GP, general practitioner. 
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